JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
TemPay, Inc. (
TemPay contends that Biltres Staffing and the Biltres Defendants were engaged in a classic "ponzi-type" scheme whereby they used TemPay money from new factored invoices to pay older invoices as they became due. TemPay also contends the Biltres Defendants wrongfully converted to their own use payments that TemPay deposited into Constandina Biltres' personal bank account.
Biltres Staffing, Otto Biltres (with the exception of the fraudulent transfer claim), and PFG Loans apparently concede liability (or at least concede that TemPay is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability), but dispute the amount of damages that TemPay is entitled to recover.
TemPay, a company that specializes in payroll funding and accounts receivable factoring, entered into several Master Factoring Agreements (
During the time frame relevant to this dispute, Otto Biltres was the "President" of Biltres Staffing and Constandina Biltres was the sole managing member of Biltres Staffing.
Pursuant to the April 20, 2011 Master Agreement, TemPay purchased receivables
On October 10, 2011, TemPay and Biltres Staffing entered into a new Master Agreement that provided terms more favorable to Biltres Staffing due to "Biltres Staffing's increased invoices and alleged excellent track record as a TemPay customer to date." Affidavit of Larry Holstein (Dkt. 96-2), ¶¶ 5-6. In addition, based on Otto Biltres' representation that Constandina Biltres no longer had any involvement with, or interest in, Biltres Staffing, Constandina Biltres was not required to execute a Guaranty with respect to the October 10, 2011 Master Agreement. Id. Otto Biltres signed the October 10, 2011 Master Agreement as President of Biltres Staffing and executed a Guaranty personally guaranteeing Biltres Staffing's performance under the October 10, 2011 Master Agreement.
During the course of the parties' relationship, TemPay became suspicious of Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres's business activities, based in large part on the steady weekly increase in staffing invoices and several customer payments that were returned for insufficient funds. In November 2011, TemPay commenced an investigation into the legitimacy of the accounts receivable purchased from Biltres Staffing. TemPay requested that Otto Biltres provide contact information for the Biltres Staffing customers. Otto Biltres furnished what he contended was the requested information and TemPay contacted the "customers" and "confirmed" the legitimacy of the outstanding invoices.
TemPay continued its investigation even after contacting the purported Biltres Staffing Customers. TemPay first discovered that the bank account number for Miller Contracting was identical to the account number TemPay had on file for Biltres Staffing and was the same account into which TemPay wired Biltres Staffing's weekly cash payments. In addition, TemPay independently obtained contact information for Biltres Staffing's "customers" only to learn that none of these purported customers had ever heard of Otto Biltres,
TemPay subsequently discovered that Otto Biltres had filed fictitious name notifications for one or more of the Biltres Staffing Customers, owned the email addresses of the purported customer contacts furnished to TemPay, and that the Bank of America accounts purportedly owned by the Biltres Staffing Customers were actually owned or controlled by Otto Biltres.
Summary judgment is proper if, following discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue of fact is `material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004). "An issue of fact is `genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id. at 1260. All the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The Court will not weigh the evidence or make findings of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court's role is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Id.
Defendants each filed separate responses to TemPay's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 101, 102, 103). Biltres Staffing does not dispute that it is liable to TemPay, but argues that TemPay has failed to provide sufficient factual support to allow the Court to determine the amount of damages it has suffered.
On December 21, 2011, TemPay took the depositions of Otto Biltres, both in his individual capacity and as the corporate representative of Biltres Staffing, and of Constandina Biltres. Otto Biltres asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination in response to virtually every question regarding this dispute. Constandina Biltres likewise refused to answer the majority of questions concerning her involvement with Biltres Staffing and various financial matters, including questions about the receipt, transfer, and disposition of moneys from TemPay.
The general rule is that an adverse inference may be drawn against a party in a civil action when he refuses to testify in response to probative evidence against him. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); United States v. A Single Family Residence and Real Property, 803 F.2d 625, 629 n. 4 (11th Cir.1986). Defendants correctly note, however, that "[t]he negative inference, if any, to be drawn from the assertion of the Fifth Amendment does not substitute for evidence needed to meet the burden of production" required to obtain summary judgment. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1580 (11th Cir.1991). "Rather, a party seeking summary judgment must establish independently the elements of [each] claim within the confines of [Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]." SEC v. Scherm, 854 F.Supp. 900, 905 (N.D.Ga.1993) (citing Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1580).
TemPay does not rely solely on the negative inference to be drawn from the Defendants' invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, it offers substantial independent evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. When, as here, a party seeking summary judgment produces additional direct evidence above and beyond any negative inference to be drawn by the invocation of the Fifth Amendment, entry of summary judgment is appropriate. See Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 582 (5th Cir.1982) (direct evidence in addition to negative inference confirmed appellee's involvement).
To prevail on its fraud claim, TemPay must prove that Biltres Staffing and the Biltres Defendants (1) made a false statement regarding a material fact, (2) knew or should have known the statement was false at the time it was made, (3) intended that TemPay would rely on the false statement, and (4) TemPay justifiably relied on the false statement and was injured as a result. See, e.g., Collins v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1292-1293 (M.D.Fla.2010) (quoting Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So.2d 826, 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)).
Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres do not challenge TemPay's contention that it is entitled to summary judgment against them on its claim for fraud in Count I of the Amended Complaint. Morever, the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres knowingly made false statements regarding material facts intending that TemPay would rely on the false statements, TemPay justifiably relied on the false statements, and TemPay was injured as a result. Thus, the only issues remaining as to Count I are (1) whether Constandina Biltres is liable for fraud and (2) the amount of damages that TemPay is entitled to recover. As discussed below, disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on these issues.
TemPay also argues that Constandina Biltres may be held liable for the fraudulent conduct of Otto Biltres and Biltres Staffing based on her role as the managing member of Biltres Staffing. TemPay correctly notes that as the managing and sole member of Biltres Staffing, Constandina Biltres was the only individual entitled to share in the profits and losses of the company, the only individual with the right to receive distributions of Biltres Staffing's assets, and the only individual with voting and management rights. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 608.402; Fla. Stat. § 608.422; see also Olmstead v. F.T.C., 44 So.3d 76, 79 (Fla.2010).
In response, Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay's attempt to hold her liable for the fraud committed by Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres based on her alleged failure to perform her duties as manager of Biltres Staffing fails for at least two reasons. First, Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay did not assert a separate claim in the Amended Complaint purporting to hold her liable for her alleged failure to perform her duties as the managing member of Biltres Staffing. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that the federal pleading "standard . . . does not afford plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise new claims at the summary judgment stage").
In general, "the members, managers, and managing members of a limited liability company are not liable, solely by reason of being a member or serving as a manager or managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company. . . ." Fla. Stat. § 608.4227. An exception to this general rule is created by Section 608.4228, Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:
Fla. Stat. § 608.4228.
The undisputed evidence is insufficient to establish that Constandina Biltres personally engaged in fraud or that she is liable to TemPay based on a breach of her duty as a managing member of Biltres Staffing under Section 608.4228(1)(b), Florida Statutes. At best, a review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to create an
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres on Count I of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability. TemPay is not entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres on Count I.
To prevail on its claim for fraud in the inducement, TemPay must prove that the Biltres Defendants (1) misrepresented a material fact, (2) knew or should have known that the statement was false, (3) intended that the false statement would induce TemPay to enter into a contract or a business relationship, and (4) Tempay was injured by acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. See, e.g., Eclipse Medical, Inc. v. American Hydro-Surgical
Otto Biltres does not challenge TemPay's contention that it is entitled to summary judgment against him on its claim for fraud in the inducement in Count II of the Amended Complaint. Moreover, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Otto Biltres knowingly made false statements to TemPay with the intention, and effect, of inducing TemPay to enter into the October 10, 2011 Master Agreement and that TemPay was injured by acting in justifiable reliance on the false statements. Thus, the only issues remaining as to Count II are (1) whether Constandina Biltres is liable for fraud in the inducement and (2) the amount of damages that TemPay is entitled to recover.
Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay has offered no evidence establishing that she made any false statements or misrepresentations to TemPay or its agents. Constandina Biltres contends that there is not a single alleged misrepresentation referenced in the motion for summary judgment that is attributable to her. The Court agrees that the evidence of record is insufficient to support an award of summary judgment in favor of TemPay and against Constandina Biltres on its claim for fraud in the inducement.
The undisputed evidence is insufficient to establish that Constandina Biltres personally engaged in fraud in the inducement by making false statements to TemPay or that she is liable to TemPay based on a breach of her duty as a managing member of Biltres Staffing under Section 608.4228(1)(b), Florida Statutes. At best, the record contains evidence sufficient to create an
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Otto Biltres on Count II of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability. TemPay is not entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres on Count II.
To prevail on its breach of contract claim against Biltres Staffing, TemPay
Biltres Staffing does not challenge TemPay's contention that TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against it on TemPay's breach of contract claim in Count III of the Amended Complaint. Moreover, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that a valid contract existed (i.e., the April 2011 Master Agreement) and that Biltres Staffing breached the April 2011 Master Agreement by, inter alia, submitting fraudulent invoices containing fake customers and employees. See, e.g., Master Agreement, § 4.7. Disputed issues of material fact exist, however, as to the amount of damages arising from this breach both because it is unclear if all monetary obligations under the April 2011 Agreement were satisfied
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Biltres Staffing on Count III of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability.
An action for breach of a guaranty arises from a debtor's default and the guarantor's subsequent failure to pay. See Brunswick Corp. v. Creel, 471 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). To prevail on its breach of guaranty claim against Otto Biltres, TemPay must prove that all of the conditions precedent to the Otto Biltres' liability have occurred or were performed. See Rossi v. Pocono Point, LLC, No. 6:08-CV-750-Or-28KRS, 2009 WL 435064, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 20, 2009); Alderman Interior Systems, Inc. v. First Nat'l-Heller Factors, Inc., 376 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Otto Biltres does not challenge TemPay's contention that it is entitled to summary judgment against him on its claim for breach of guaranty in Count IV of the Amended Complaint. Moreover, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that a valid contract existed (i.e., the April 2011 Guaranty) and that Otto Biltres breached the April 2011 Guaranty by, inter alia, failing to ensure that Biltres Staffing submitted accurate and legitimate invoices to TemPay under the April 2011 Master Agreement. Disputed issues of material fact exist, however, as to the amount of damages arising from his breach both because it is unclear if all monetary obligations under the April 2011 Agreement were satisfied and whether the October
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Otto Biltres on Count IV of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability.
Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay's attempt to hold her liable for breach of the April 2011 Guaranty fails because the undisputed facts demonstrate that all monetary obligations incurred by Biltres Staffing under the April 2011 Master Agreement were satisfied. Even assuming that all
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres on Count V of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability.
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("
The concept of "unfair and deceptive" conduct is extremely broad. See, e.g., Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 761 So.2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). A deceptive practice is one that is "likely to mislead" consumers. Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). An unfair practice is "one that `offends established public policy' and one that is `immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.'" Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So.2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Spiegel, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir.1976)).
Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay has failed to provide evidence demonstrating what specific misrepresentations and/or deceptive practices she allegedly engaged in that would subject her to liability under the FDUTPA. The Court agrees that the evidence of record is insufficient to support summary judgment in favor of TemPay and against Constandina Biltres under the FDUTPA.
"Piercing the corporate veil is not necessary to hold an individual officer liable under FDUTPA; however, the aggrieved party must show that the individual was a `direct participant' in the improper dealings." North American Clearing, Inc. v. Brokerage Computer Systems, Inc., 666 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1311 (M.D.Fla.2009) (quoting KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So.2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)).
KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see Nationwide Mut. Co. v. Ft. Myers Total Rehab Center, Inc., 657 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1288 (M.D.Fla.2009) (noting that in order to proceed against an individual using a FDUTPA violation theory, an aggrieved party must allege that the individual was a direct participant in the improper dealings).
The undisputed evidence is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that Constandina Biltres personally engaged in fraudulent or deceptive trade practices in violation of the FDUTPA or that she breached her duties as the managing member of Biltres Staffing under Section 608.4228(b), Florida Statutes.
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres on Count VI of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability. TemPay is not entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres on Count VI.
TemPay seeks to avoid under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("
Under section 726.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, a transfer by a debtor "is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made . . ., if the debtor made the transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. . . ." Morton v. Cord Realty, Inc., 677 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In order to invalidate the allegedly fraudulent transfers from the Biltres Defendants to PFG Loans, TemPay must prove: (1) it was a creditor of the Biltres Defendants; (2) the Biltres Defendants, as debtors, intended to defraud TemPay; and (3) the Biltres Defendants conveyed property to PFG Loans that could have been applied to the debt due TemPay. See Nationsbank,
PFG Loans does not challenge TemPay's contention that it is entitled to summary judgment against it on the fraudulent transfer claim.
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act "was not intended to serve as a vehicle by which a creditor may bring a suit against a non-transferee party . . . for monetary damages arising from the non-transferee party's alleged aiding-abetting of a fraudulent money transfer." Freeman v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 865 So.2d 1272, 1277 (Fla.2004). The individual Biltres Defendants argue that they are neither debtors nor transferees with respect to the alleged fraudulent transfers and, therefore, cannot be held liable under the FUFTA. That is, the individual Biltres Defendants contend that, at most, they aided and abetted Biltres Staffing (i.e., the debtor) in transferring the disputed funds to a third party (i.e., PFG Loans).
The Biltres Defendants' argument ignores the fact that they were guarantors on one or both of the factoring agreements at issue. That is, Otto Biltres was, and Constandina Biltres might have been, a debtor of TemPay based on the guarantees and the past fraud committed with respect to TemPay. See Friedman v. Heart Institute of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So.2d 189, 192 (2003) ("A `claim' under the FUFTA may be maintained even though contingent and not yet reduced to judgment.") (quoting Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So.2d 37, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)); see also Fleming v. Otis Elevator Co., 107 Fla. 557, 145 So. 201, 203 (1933) (noting that in a suit to vacate debtor's fraudulent conveyance, debtor's wife joining in conveyance is proper but not indispensable party). In short, this is not a situation where the Biltres Defendants merely aided and abetted a fraudulent money transfer. Instead, liability for the fraudulent transfers is premised on the fact that the individual defendants themselves were debtors who owed money to TemPay.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Otto Biltres made the transfers as a debtor of TemPay and with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud TemPay. In contrast, disputed issues of material fact exists as to whether Constandina Biltres was a debtor at the time of the purportedly fraudulent transfers (i.e., whether the obligations relating to the Guaranty executed in connection with the April 10, 2011 Agreement had been satisfied) and whether she intended to defraud TemPay.
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Otto Biltres and PFG Loans on Count VII of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability. TemPay is not entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres.
To prevail on its Florida RICO Act claims against Biltres Staffing and the
Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres do not challenge TemPay's contention that it is entitled to summary judgment against them on its claims for violations of the Florida RICO Act. Moreover, the undisputed evidence reveals that Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres participated in a scheme to defraud TemPay of money by means of material misrepresentations using the mails or wires (e.g., Biltres Staffing sent fraudulent invoices and payments via Federal Express to TemPay and the defendants used wire transfers to conceal their scheme to defraud and to transfer for their personal use money fraudulently obtained from TemPay) and that TemPay reasonably relied on those misrepresentations resulting in damages. Thus, the only issues remaining as to Count VIII are (1) whether Constandina Biltres is liable for violating the Florida RICO Act and (2) the amount of damages that TemPay is entitled to recover. As discussed below, disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on these issues.
Constandina Biltres argues that TemPay has failed to present sufficient undisputed facts to establish what statements she made or conduct she engaged in constituted participation in the alleged criminal enterprise. As discussed above in connection with TemPay's other claims against Constandina Biltres, there are disputed issues of material fact as to the role, if any, Constandina Biltres played in the fraudulent scheme or enterprise orchestrated by Otto Biltres.
Based on the foregoing, TemPay is entitled to summary judgment against Biltres Staffing and Otto Biltres on Count VIII of the Amended Complaint solely as to the issue of liability. TemPay is not entitled to summary judgment against Constandina Biltres on Count VIII.
Irrespective of whether TemPay is entitled to summary judgment as to liability, all Defendants argue that summary judgment is inappropriate because TemPay has failed to provide sufficient factual support to allow a determination of the amount of damages it has suffered. Specifically, Defendants argue that TemPay's calculation of damages is overstated and inaccurate.
TemPay contends that as of February 4, 2013, Defendants owed TemPay $3,275.857.70.
Defendants argue that TemPay has failed to identify those portions of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file that establish its alleged injury. See Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 941 F.Supp. 1567, 1568 (M.D.Fla.1996) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). In addition, Defendants argue that TemPay has failed to provide a reasonable calculation for its damages, including damages tailored to the specific claims asserted against one or more of the Defendants. For example, Defendants argue that the damages recoverable by TemPay differ between its tort,
On the fraudulent transfer claim, TemPay seeks to avoid transfers from the Biltres Defendants to PFG Loans made between September and December of 2011 that TemPay alleges were used by the Biltres Defendants to "pay down and to pre-pay their mortgage through October, 2012." The total amount of the alleged fraudulent transfers, however, is unclear from the record.
Because TemPay bears the burden of proving the amount of damages it suffered, and disputed issues of material fact exist as to the amount of damages due TemPay,
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, TemPay, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants (Dkt. 96) is
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